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INTRODUCTION

A new era in Canada's constitutional development began on June
23, 1990, when the proposed Meech Lake Accord 1 (Accord) collapsed. 2 This historic event represented the latest step in the evolution of Canada's Constitution. The Accord was designed to strike a
new internal balance, or equilibrium, in Canada's constitutional architecture. 3 Since the British Parliament statutorily created Canada as a
legal governmental entity in 1876,4 the nation has struggled with the
task of establishing a viable Canadian federal structure, sovereign and
independent from Britain. 5 Unfortunately, every scheme or proposal
has been unacceptable to at least one of the provinces6 and has ended,
as did the Accord, in failure.
At the present time, the Canadian national agenda is focused on
devising a new constitutional order under which all the provinces can
exist in harmony. Most commentators agree that the current constitutional status quo if left unmodified will be untenable. 7
1. Meech Lake Accord, June 23, 1987, reprinted in PETER w. HOGG, MEECH LAKE
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD ANNOTATED appendix 1 (1988) [hereinafter ACCORD].
2. See John F. Bums, Canada Abandons Accords on Quebec, N .Y. TIMES, June 23, 1990,
§ 1 (Foreign Desk), at 1.
3. See Thomas J. Courchene, Meech Lake and Federalism: Accord or Discord?, in COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS: THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD 122 (Katherine E. Swinton
& Carol J. Rogerson eds., 1988) [hereinafter VISIONS].
4. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., ch.3 (U.K.) renamed Constitution
Act, 1867, by Canada Act, R.S.C., Appendices (No. 44)(1985)(Can.) reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbot H. Flanz eds., 1983)
[hereinafter BNA Act].
5. See Joel Bakan & Danielle Pinard, Getting to the Bottom of Meech Lake: A Discussion
on Some Recent Writings on the 1987 Constitutional Accord, 21 OTTAWA L. REV. 247 (1989).
See also Cairns, The Canadian Constitutional Experiment, 9 DALHOUSIE L.J. 87 (1984). This
is commonly referred to as "patriation." The term is uniquely Canadian. It refers to the
political movement to establish a legal system that does not require British Parliamentary
consent and Royal assent to amend the Canadian constitution. Id.
6. See CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1918 (James H. Marsh, ed., 2d. ed. 1988). Canada is
comprised of the provinces of British Columbia (1871), Alberta (1905), Saskatchewan (1905),
Manitoba (1870), Ontario (1867), Quebec (1867), Newfoundland (1949), New Brunswick
(1867), Nova Scotia (1867), Prince Edward Island (1873), the Yukon (1898) and Northwest
Territories (1870) (year indicates when entered into union). See id.
7. See, e.g. , Thomas J. Courchene & John N. McDougall, The Context for Future Consti-
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Quebec, the province which was to benefit the most from the Accord, renewed its discussions about becoming a sovereign state. 8 In
September 1990, Quebec created the Commission on the Constitutional and Political Future of Quebec9 (Quebec Commission). The
Quebec Commission announced in March 1991 that it would give the
other provinces twenty months to make proposals to Quebec for a
new Canadian constitutional order. 10 Quebec's government will then
tum to its people and ask them to decide if Quebec will be associated
with Canada or move for complete independence. 11
On the federal level, the Canadian Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, placed before the Canadian House of Commons a document
named Shaping Canada's Future Together on September 24, 1991. 12
The document contains twenty-eight proposals for constitutional reform including the changes the Accord would have implemented, as
well as many new suggestions. The Prime Minister has proposed a
vision for Canada's future which would maintain the current federal
structure, while moving toward an economic union similar to the European Community (EC).•3
Canada's present constitutional dilemma parallels the breakdown
of other federal structures throughout the world. The individual
states within the former Soviet Union, India, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have become disenchanted with their existing federal orders
and are experiencing what is referred to as "regional self-determination."14 Like Quebec, they are now exercising their right to decide by
which fundamental laws they are to be govemed. 1s The dismantling
of these existing federal structures magnifies the significance of the
tutional Options, in OPTIONS FOR A NEW CANADA 105 - 09 (Ronald H. Watts & Douglas M.
Brown eds., 1991) [hereinafter OPTIONS].
8. See discussion infra text part 111.C.
9. See Guy Laforest, Quebec Beyond the Federal Regime of 1867-1982: From Distinct
Society to National Community, in OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 105 - 06. The Quebec Commission is officially called La Commission sur l'avenir constitutionnel et po/itique du Quebec. Id.
10. See John F. Bums, Canadian Leader Appeals for Calm on Quebec Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1990, § 1 (Foreign Desk), at 1.
11. Id.
12. Shaping a New Future, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 25, 1991, at A23 (reprinting the full
text of all 28 proposals) [hereinafter Shaping a New Future].
13. Id. at proposals 7(11), 14(1), 14(5), 16, 28.
14. This phrase has been used by Professor Hilary K. Josephs of the Syracuse University
College of Law to describe this recent global phenomenon. See also Carol Goar, Small Won-

der Foreigners Fear for Canada It'll Take More than Derek Burney's Bravado to Convince
World We're not Just Another Fragmenting Federation, TORONTO STAR, July 13, 1991, (Insight), at 04. See generally LEE c. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978).
15. Id.
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historical events in Western Europe where several states have come
together to form a new legal order, the European Union.
The creation of the European Union has been an ongoing process. In 1951, the Treaty of Paris 16 was adopted creating the first
common market, for coal and steel, in Europe and planting the seeds
for what became the EC. During the past forty years, this strict economic structure has developed slowly, integrating the diverse economies of the 12 member states into one entity. 17 Agreements between
the member states form the foundation of the economic legal order to
which all governments, businesses and citizens of the EC adhere. The
laws and institutions of the EC are separate from those of member
states, but they were molded according to the common interests of the
member nations and several fundamental principles. 18 The European
Community has recently undertaken the next phase of its development. The agreement completed at the Maastricht Summit in December 1991 19 will transform the sophisticated economic entity into
one clearly identifiable group, the European Union. 20 This agreement
will strengthen the economic ties by adding an "economic and monetary union" to the EC framework and, independent of the EC, establish inter-governmental cooperation in the areas of foreign policy and
security. The legal framework of the European Union has been described as a federal constitutional framework. 21
In response to the Quebec Commission's request for proposals,
16. Treaty instituting the Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140
[hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. The only authentic version of the treaty is in French.
17. See P.S.R.F. MATHUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW 6 (5th ed.
1990) [hereinafter MATHUSEN 5th]. The member nations of the EC are France, Germany,
Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece,
and Denmark. Id.
18. See DOMINIK LASOK & JOHN BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 27 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter LASOK]. See also discussion of the Schuman Plan
infra text part IV .A.
19. Maastricht Summit Succeeds on EC Economic and Political Union, Eurecom
(Monthly Bulletin of European Community Economic and Financial News), Vol. 3, No. 11,
Dec. 1991 [hereinafter Maastricht Summit Succeeds]. The text of the agreement done at Maastricht was not available at the time this article was completed.
20. Bruce Barnard, Making Sense of Maastricht, EUROPE, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 14 [hereinafter Making Sense of Maastricht]. The European Union refers to a legal order which is comprised of a strict economic legal order known as the European Community and the agreements
concerning inter-governmental cooperation between the member states in areas of foreign policy and security.
21. See Prodromos D. Dagtoglou, The Legal Nature of the European Community, in
THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW 34 - 41 (1983) [hereinafter THIRTY YEARS](two theories of the European model are discussed: a functional, or federal system, and a supra-national
organization). See also LASOK, supra note 18 (the authors correlate the EC to either a federal
system or a confederation).
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individuals from every field in Canada have been offering suggestions
for a new federal model. 22 The EC had been suggested as a model for
solving previous constitutional problems in Canada. 23 Once again,
scholars are looking to Europe to see if such a system would be viable
for Canada. 24
The purpose of this Note is to analyze whether the European
Union is a viable solution to Canada's disintegrating constitutional
order. Part II will discuss the historical background of the present
constitutional order of Canada. It will examine the historical, political and social context that brought about changes in Canada's basic
laws. In part III, the impact that the Meech Lake Accord would have
had on the present constitutional framework in Canada and the
events after its failure will be analyzed. Part IV will provide an overview of the historical context of the European Union's creation and
the fundamental principles which guided it. Additionally, its institutions and the completion of the internal market by December 31,
1992, will be discussed. An overview of the Maastricht Summit will
be provided to explain how its proposals for economic and monetary
union as well as political cooperation will change the shape of the
existing European Union. Finally, part V will outline possible constitutional structures for Canada and analyze the federal government's
recent proposal. This Note concludes that federal institutions guided
by fundamental principles governing limited areas of provincial sovereignty, like the European Union's, could form a new, socially legitimate Canadian constitutional order.
II.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EXISTING
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF CANADA

The British North America Act, 1867: The Founding
Instrument

The three British North American colonies25 were confederated
22. See generally PHILIP RESNICK, TOWARD A CANADA-QUEBEC UNION (1991) [hereinafter RESNICK]; OPTIONS, supra note 7.
23. See David Matas, The EEC as a Model for Canada, 10 MANITOBA L.J. 259
(1980)(citing (1977) Canadian House of Commons Debates, at 3245, per Claude Wagner).
Matas argued that the EEC model could not work for Canada because the provinces would
never agree to a system where they would lose aspects of the sovereignty they now enjoy to the
federal government. Id. at 279.
24. See Dan Soberman, European Integration: Are there Lessons for Canada?, in OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 191.
25. The colonies brought together were Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. See
BNA Act, supra note 4, preamble. See also RONALD E. CHEFFINS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS IN CANADA 24 - 25 (1969).
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on July l, 1867, when the British Parliament enacted the British
North America Act, 1867 (BNA Act). 26 The three separate colonies
were united into one federation which was divided into four provinces.27 The individuals responsible for establishing the first confederal Canadian legal order were influenced by the constitutional
experience of the United States28 and the constitutional traditions of
Great Britain. 29 The government, as established by the BNA Act,
was comparable to the United Kingdom model of government, however, it divided governmental powers between a central Dominion
government and provincial governments. 30 While the BNA Act provided the legal framework for, 31 and placed limitations upon, 32 the
Canadian government, it did not provide an internal mechanism to
amend the law that created the federation. 33 As Canadian legal independence from the United Kingdom (U.K.) came to be recognized in
the twentieth century, the unsuitability of this process became
apparent.
In 1919, Canada obtained independent international status when
the U.K. requested that Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South
Africa be given separate representation in the assembly of the League
of Nations. 34 Canada's autonomy from the U.K. was evident by its
participation in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. 3s The irony of an
26. See BNA Act, supra note 4.
27. The BNA Act, 1867 created Ontario (formerly Upper Canada), Quebec (formerly
Lower Canada), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. See GERALD L. GALL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 43 (2d student ed. 1983).
28. See CARL J. FREIDRICH, THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD
60- 61 (1967). The United States Constitution of 1776 was the written document which influenced the drafting of the federal structure in Canada. In contrast to the U.S. model, where all
powers remain in the states unless expressly given to the federal government, the BNA Act
placed all residual powers in the Dominion, the federal government and the provinces have
only certain enumerated powers. See E. RUSSELL HOPKINS, CONFEDERATION AT THE CROSSROADS 1 (1968).
29. See GALL, supra note 27, at 46 - 48. See also HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 1.
30. The preamble of the BNA Act, 1867 states that the "Provinces . . . desire to be
federally united ... with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom."
BNA Act, supra note 4, at preamble.
31. BNA Act, 1867 creates and enumerates the powers of the branches of the federal
government: The Executive §§ 9 - 16, The Legislature §§ 17 - 51 (Senate §§ 21-36 and House
of Commons §§ 37 - 57), and The Judicature§§ 96 - 101. See BNA Act, supra note 4.
32. BNA Act, supra note 4, at pt. VII.
33. See NEIL FINKELSTEIN, 1 LASKIN'S CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (5th ed.
1986) [hereinafter LASKIN's].
34. See 4 AMOS J. PEASELEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 206 (3d ed. 1970).
35. See ROBERT M. DAWSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 47 - 49 (5th ed. 1970).
For a discussion of Canada's early treaty making see R.J. Delisle, Treaty Making Power in
Canada, in ONTARIO ADVISORY COMMITTEE CONFEDERATION 115 (1967).
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apparently sovereign nation having to request amendments for its
constitution from another state increased with the passage of the Statute of Westminster, 1931. 36 Although this British law provided for
Canada's independence from the U.K., the U.K. retained complete
power to amend the BNA Act and the location of a court of final
appeal. 37
The issue came into focus once again when Canada accepted
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 193038 and again when it became a United Nations member in
1945. 39 During the twentieth century, the federal and provincial governments in Canada made repeated efforts to "patriate"40 Canada's
Constitution, that is, formulate a procedure to amend its basic laws
without British Parliamentary involvement.

B.

In Search of a Solution

The search for a satisfactory procedure for amending the Canadian Constitution has been pursued since the Imperial Conference of
1926. 41 The first significant discussions took place at the DominionProvincial Conference of 1927. 42 The same issue was subsequently
addressed by federal and provincial leaders in 1935-36, 1950, 1960-61,
1964, 1971, 1981 and 1987. 4 3
In 1935, a special committee was created by the Canadian House
of Commons to address the amending problem. 44 Due to the urgency
of the matter, it called for a Dominion-Provincial conference which
produced a "Continuing Committee on Constitutional Questions. " 4 s
The committee, composed of federal and provincial officials, proposed
general amending procedures and an amendment to the Statute of
Westminster to enable the Parliament of Canada to replace the BNA
36. Statute of Westminster, 1931, R.S., ch. 107 § 2; 1967 - 68; c.7 § 8 cited in Interpretation Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-23, § ;1967 - 68 (Can.).
37. See DAWSON, supra note 35, at 48 - 50.
38. Canada deposited the instrument accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the World
Court on July 28, 1930, accepted on September 20, 1929, 88 L.N.T.S. 282, ratified on July 28,
1930, 100 L.N.T.S. 155, and terminated jurisdiction on April 7, 1970, 724 U.N.T.S. 421.
39. Original signatory nation to U.N. Charter at the San Francisco Conference on June
26, 1945. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, DocUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CoURT OF JUSTICE
301 (2d ed. 1979).
40. See supra note 5.
41. See GUY FAVREAU, THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (1965).
42. See DoMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCES 1927, 1935, AND 1941 (1943).
43. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 267.
44. See id. at 268.
45. Conference Resolution Jan. 8, 1936. Id.
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Act with a constitution. 46 This new constitution would include an
amending process that would be exercised completely within Canada. 47 Although no final decision was ever reached, the basic principle that the establishment of an amendment procedure required
negotiation between federal and provincial governments guided all
subsequent conferences. 48
The concerns of World War II and post-war reconstruction sidetracked the "amendment procedure" problem until 1950.49 The
Right Hon. Louis St. Laurent50 noted that the role of Canada in the
two World Wars demonstrated its capacity to bear nationhood and he
put the pursuit of an amending procedure back on the national
agenda. 51
Accordingly, a Constitutional Conference of federal and provincial officials met in Ottawa in January 1950. 52 They proposed that
provisions of the BNA Act which concerned six different areas should
each have a different amending procedure. 53 However, no concrete
decisions were made at this conference and the issue was left open for
another meeting. s4
A conference of Attorney Generals met on four occasions
throughout 1960 and 1961. 55 On December 1, 1961, the meeting produced a draft proposal called the "Fulton Formula." 56 The proposed
scheme embodied a three-fold amending procedure with provisions
addressing the delegation of legislative power. 57 Saskatchewan and
Quebec objected to the entrenchment of this formula in the Canadian
Constitution as it would give the federal government the right to
46. Id.
4 7. HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 268.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 268 - 69.
50. Prime Minister of Canada from 1948 - 57. See 3 THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA
1946 (James H. Marsh ed., 2d ed. 1988).
51. See HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 268 - 69 (citing National Broadcast (CBC radio broadcast, May 9, 1949)).
52. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF FEDERAL & PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS (1951). First Session: Ottawa, Jan. 10 - 12, 1950; Second Session: Quebec, Sept. 25 - 28, 1950.
53. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 74. For example, amendments concerning only the
Canadian Parliament could be made by an act of the Canadian Parliament alone. Id.
54. See HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 269.
55. Id. at 270.
56. Fulton Formula, reprinted in 12 McGILL L. J. 576 (1966- 67)(The November 6, 1961
Draft Amendment formally named An Act to Provide for the Amendment in Canada of the
Constitution of Canada). Named for the leadership provided by the then Federal Minister of
Justice, Edmund D. Fulton.
57. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 74.
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amend any part of the constitution without the unanimous consent of
the provinces as a temporary step toward patriation. Saskatchewan
and Quebec feared that, once this short term remedy was created, no
effort to find a better amending formula would be made within
Canada. 58
In 1964, a Dominion-Provincial Conference addressed the
amending issues that had been tabled by the 1961 Conference. s9 The
Fulton Formula was revised by an Attorney Generals Conference in
Ottawa. The Attorney Generals unanimously recommended the new
"Fulton-Favreau Formula"60 be passed by the Conference of Provincial Prime Ministers. It was unanimously accepted and subsequently
approved by every provincial legislature except Quebec's in 1966. 61
Quebec opposed the proposal, perceiving it to be inflexible and fearing
that it would prohibit future constitutional change. 62 Once again, a
national political effort to patriate the Canadian Constitution failed.
Five years later, in 1971, at the Victoria Conference, another proposal for constitutional reform was drafted. 63 The Victoria Charter
outlined an amending formula for Canadian patriation. 64 Once again,
Quebec could not support the proposal because, among other things,
the proposal did not change the distribution of powers in relation to
the Social Security system. 6 s
In 1978, the Constitutional Amendment Bill, or Bill C-60, was
introduced in the Canadian Parliament by the Trudeau government. 66
It was a unilateral attempt to reform aspects of the constitution over
58. See B.L. Strager, Sakastchewan and the Amendment of the Canadian Constitution, 12
McGILL L.J. 443, 462 {1966 - 67).
59. See PETER w. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 54 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter HOGG].
60. Fulton-Favreau Formula, reprinted in 12 McGILL L.J. 579 (1966 - 67)(The October
30, 1964 Draft Amendment formally named An Act to Provide for the Amendment in Canada
of the Constitution of Canada). Named after the Federal Ministers of Justice principally involved at the conferences in 1961, Edmund D. Fulton, and in 1964, Guy Favreau. See Bora
Laskin, Amendment of the Constitution: Applying the Fulton-Favreau Formula, 11 McGILL
L.J. 2 (1965).
61. See LASKIN's supra note 33, at 75.
62. See GUY FAVREAU, THE AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (1965)
[hereinafter White Paper]. This document was presented as a "White Paper" at the 1964
Dominion-Provincial Conference on the amending problem.
63. See LASKIN'S, supra note 33, at 75.
64. Id. The procedure "required the consent of 1) Parliament, 2) any province which at
any time contained more than twenty five percent of the Nation's population, 3) two Atlantic
provinces and 4) two Western Provinces comprising at least fifty percent of the region's population." Id.
65. See DONALD v. SMILEY, CANADA IN QUESTION: FEDERALISM IN THE SEVENTIES
41 - 54 (1972).
66. See LASKIN'S, supra note 33, at 75.
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which the Federal Parliament had exclusive control. 67 The Trudeau
government indicated its desire to take the first step towards bringing
the Canadian Constitution under the control of the Canadian government by calling for consultation with provinces in a First Ministers'
Conference. 68 However, this movement ended and the amending
problem was left unsolved as a result of provincial opposition and a
change in control of the federal government following the 1979
elections. 69
C.

The Rise of Quebec's Move for Independence

The aforementioned proposals for a procedure to amend the Canadian Constitution without British Parliamentary approval had not
been acceptable to Quebec. In fact, beginning in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, a movement in Quebec referred to as the "Quiet Revolution"70 increased the ethnic consciousness of that French-speaking
province. One consequence was that the requirements that any proposed constitutional change would have to satisfy before Quebec
would agree to them were considerably broadened. The question of
an acceptable amending procedure to accomplish patriation became
only one of the demands Quebec made before it would take part in
any future changes to Canada's Constitution.
The Quiet Revolution was the beginning of the development of
Quebec's independent identity, separate and distinct from Canada.
This social and cultural transformation saw a decline in the role of the
church and a migration of youth from the rural areas to urban cities.
It resulted in changes in education, provincialization of business and
market nationalism. 71 The goal was for Quebec to have greater control over its own affairs, 72 to become Maitres Chez Nous. 13 From
1960-66, Quebec built an infrastructure modeled after a modem capitalist society. 74 These changes were the catalyst to a political move67. See BNA Act, supra note 4, § 91(1).
68. See generally PIERRE E. TRUDEAU, A TIME FOR ACTION: Tow ARD THE RENEW AL
OF THE CANADIAN FEDERATION (1978).
69. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 75.
70. Canada Survey: From New France to New Quebec, THE EcoNOMIST, June 29, 1991,
at 7.
71. Id. at 7 - 8.
72. See WILLIAM D. CoLEMAN, THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN QUEBEC 1945 1980, 222 (1984).
73. This phrase reflects the sentiment of wanting to be "Masters in our House." See
HENRY MILNER & SHEILAGH H. MILNER, THE DECOLONIZATION OF QUEBEC AN ANALYSIS
OF LEFT-WING NATIONALISM 168 (1973).
74. Id. at 167. The provincial government began to regulate the economy and established

many state enterprises most notably Hydro-Quebec, a regional electric production facility. Id.
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ment that called for political change within Quebec.
As a result, political parties that emerged in the 1960s advocated
independence and chose a course of radical change for Quebec.
Among others, The Front de liberation du Quebec (F.L. Q.) and the
Rassemblement pour l'independance nationale (R.LN.) mobilized
their efforts for a completely independent Quebec. 75 They envisioned
Quebec as a completely sovereign nation with its own constitution. 76
In 1968, another party calling for Quebec's independence was
formed by Rene Levesque. The Parti Quebecois (P. Q.) became the
organization which gained popular support. 77 Levesque's party was
much less radical than the F.L.Q. and the R.LN. It sought to obtain
Quebec's independence through legitimate political channels. Its idea
of independence recognized that there would be some form of economic association with Canada, but little else would exist between the
two sovereigns. 78 In the aftermath of the "October Crisis" 79 and the
reaction of the federal government, the P. Q. emerged as the lone party
with a viable nationalist platform "committed to change within the
system. " 80
The P.Q. 's promise of independence won it the Quebec Provincial Parliamentary elections in 1976. 81 The move for independence
under the guidance of the P. Q. culminated in a provincial referendum
which asked the citizens of Quebec to decide its future relationship
with Canada. In its final form, the "sovereignty-association" referendum, if passed would have authorized the Quebec government to begin negotiations with the Canadian federal government on the issue of
independence.
In May 1980, the referendum failed by a 3:2 margin. 82 A decisive factor in the result was then Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's promise of "renewed federalism" for all of Canada if the
referendum was defeated. 83 Trudeau, a french Canadian, was op75. See RESNICK, supra note 22, at 20.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. As part of their push for change, F.L.Q. members kidnapped two government officials
and eventually killed one. The federal government responded by implementing martial law.
See RICHARD HANDLER, NATIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE IN QUEBEC 9
(1988).
80. Id. (citing RICHARD BASHAM, CRISIS IN BLANC AND WHITE 197 (1978)).

81. Id. at 9 - 10.
82. The referendum was defeated 60% to 40%. See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 2.
83. See PIERRE FOURNIER, A MEECH LAKE POST MORTEM: Is QUEBEC SoVEREIGNTY
INEVITABLE? 4 (S. Fischman trans. 1991 ). In a speech four days prior to the referendum,
Pierre Trudeau, the Prime Minister at the time, made a promise to renew Canadian federalism
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posed to Quebec's independence and dedicated his political efforts towards establishing a Canadian federation that included Quebec.
Trudeau used Quebec's referendum for provincial sovereignty as a
political device. He maintained that a "no" vote on the referendum
was a "yes" vote for Canadian sovereignty from Britain; a green light
to begin a new stage of constitutional development. 84 Following his
promise and given the failure of Quebec's referendum, Trudeau began
the next stage of constitutional development in Canada. The result
was two amendments to the BNA Act, 1867: 1) the Canada Act,
1982;85 and 2) the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 86

D.

The Canada Act, 1982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms

The Canada Act, 1982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
were added to the body of Canadian Constitutional law in 1982. The
outcome was, among other things, a patriated constitution and, for
the first time, the enumeration of individual rights protected by the
federal government. However, while these additions to the constitution were acceptable to nine of the ten provinces, one did not agree:
Quebec.
The sides were polarized regarding acceptable constitutional
change after the failure of the Quebec referendum. 87 Once again, in
October 1980, the provincial political factions were not able to agree
on a viable solution. 88 This was followed by an announcement by the
federal government that it would ask the British Parliament for approval of constitutional amendments without the prior consent of the
provinces. This was a remarkable event as it was contrary to established constitutional conventions. 89
if the referendum was defeated. This contemplated patriation, a Charter of Rights and a thrust
towards centralizing governmental powers. Id.
84. See generally Robert W. Kerr, Constitution Act, 1980: Is It Constitutional?, 30 U.
NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 73 (1981).
85. Canada Act, R.S.C., Appendices (No. 44)(1985)(Can.).
86. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), reprinted
in Canada, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds. 1983).
87. See generally Thomas Berger, The Charter: A Historical Perspective, 23 U. BRIT.
CoLUM. L. REV. 603 (1989). The camps were drawn between those who supported the notion
of a strong federal government and those who felt the provinces should properly maintain
greater political power. Additionally, regional differences based on economic interest and cultural distinctiveness, especially language, divided the conference. Id.
88. Id.
89. See W.H. McConnell, Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Amending Process in Canada,
44 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 195, 220 (1981); LASKIN'S, supra note 33, at 75 - 76. The term
"constitutional convention" was first used by Dicey in his LA w OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1885). These rules developed through custom and precedent in British government and were
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Canada's ability to amend its constitution prior to the 1982
amendments was guided by a mixture of written rules and constitutional conventions. 90 From 1867 to the present, no one single document has existed entitled "The Constitution of Canada."91 What is
referred to as the Canadian Constitution is a body of law composed of
written and common law rules, as well as constitutional conventions.
These conventions have evolved out of practice and custom in Canadian government and are therefore usually unwritten. Constitutional
conventions serve the vital function of ensuring that the framework of
the constitution correlates with contemporary constitutional values of
a given period. 92
Four principal constitutional conventions have emerged in Canada: (1) the U.K. Parliament would only take amending action upon
formal Canadian request; (2) the Canadian Parliament had to act in
making the request by joint address of the House and Senate; (3) no
amendment would be made at the request of a province; and (4) the
Canadian Parliament would not request an amendment directly affecting federal-provincial relations without prior consultation and
agreement with the provinces. 93 Therefore, Trudeau's decision to go
to the British Parliament with proposed amendments without first
consulting the provincial governments directly conflicted with the
fourth constitutional convention enumerated above.
Notwithstanding the conventions, the Trudeau-led federal government introduced a resolution in the Canadian Parliament. The
resolution asked the U.K. Parliament to approve an act that would
entrench a modified version of the Victoria Charter's amending
formula 94 in the Canadian Constitution, thereby finally patriating
Canada's Constitution. 9 s
This resolution was delayed by opposition in the Canadian Parliament and by eight provinces that disagreed with the bill. 96 The
federal government also stalled the bill's passage to allow the Supreme
Court of Canada time to rule on the constitutionality of its actions. 97
incorporated into the governments of the British colonies, i.e., Canada. See also W.S. Holdsworth, The Conventions of the Eighteenth Century Constitution, 17 IOWA L. REV. 161 (1932).
90. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 72 - 73.
91. Id. at 72.
92. See Hogg, supra note 59, at 19 - 20.
93. See White Paper, supra note 62.
94. See COLEMAN, supra note 72.
95. See LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 75.
96. Only Ontario and New Brunswick supported the federal resolution. Id.
97. Id. at 76.
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In the Patriation Case, 98 the Supreme Court decided that it would be
"unconstitutional in a conventional sense" for the federal government
to lay this bill before the British Parliament without first having provincial agreement. 99 Accordingly, Trudeau had to have the support
of the provinces for his patriation proposal. 100
Following the Supreme Court's ruling, the "Gang of Eight" 101
provinces that joined political forces to oppose the federal initiative
led a national debate over the manner in which constitutional change
should take place. The result was another First Ministers' Meeting in
November 1981. 102 After months of deliberation, a deal was struck to
which only the government of Quebec objected.103
The result was the Canada Act, 1982 which encompassed two
major amendments to the BNA Act, 1867 as well as renaming it the
Constitution Act, 1867. 104 First, it transferred the power to amend
the Canadian Constitution from the British Parliament to the Canadian Parliament. 10s This achieved the patriation of the Canadian
Constitution. Secondly, it added a Charter of Rights and Freedoms 106
to the Constitution which established, for the first time, constitutional
protection of individual rights from governmental encroachment.
The protection encompassed, among other things, freedom of expression, 107 equality, 108 language, 109 mobility, 110 association, 111 religion 112
and the press and other media of communication. 113
98. Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2 & 3), 125 D.L.R.
3d 1 (1982)(Can.).
99. Id. at 107. However, the Court made it explicitly clear that they were not ruling on
the exact provincial agreement needed to put the constitutional stamp on federal action. Id. at
103.
100. See Gil Remillard, The Constitution Act, 1982: An Unfinished Compromise, 32 AM.
J. COMP. L. 269, 270 (1984) [hereinafter Unfinished Compromise].
101. The provinces opposing the federal action were: Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. See
LASKIN's, supra note 33, at 75 - 76.
102. Id. at 76. See discussion supra part H.B.
103. Id. Its objection resulted in the Meech Lake Accord discussed infra text part III.
104. Section 1 of the BNA Act, 1867 was repealed and was substituted by: "This Act
may be cited as the Constitution Act, 1867." See BNA Act, 1867, supra note 4, § 1.
105. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, pt. V (Procedure for Amending Constitution
of Canada), §§ 38 - 49.
106. Id. pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §§ 1 - 34.
107. Id. § 2(b).
108. Id. § 15.
109. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, § 16.
110. Id. § 6.
111. Id. § 2(d).
112. Id. § 2(a).
113. Constitutic;m Act, 1982, supra note 86, § 2(b).
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Both Houses of the Canadian Parliament passed the resolution in
December 1981, thereby putting the proposal before the provincial
governments. The proposed amending procedure in the Canada Act,
1982 was completely unacceptable to Quebec in its proposed form and
was voted down by its parliament. 114 Rene Levesque, Quebec's Prime
Minister, refused to sign it as proposed. 11 s The formula provided that
the Constitution Act, 1867 could be amended with the consent of the
federal government and at least two-thirds of the provinces (seven of
the ten) whose aggregate population amounted to fifty percent of Canada's total population. 116 However, it also provided that a province
could "opt out" of an amendment which affected the province's legislative authority. 117 In such cases where an amendment pertained to
education or culture, the federal government would provide reasonable compensation to the province that opted out. 118 Quebec, however, desired compensation for every amendment from which it opted
out and therefore was dissatisfied with the proposed amendment.
Additionally, the Canada Act, 1982 enumerated a list of areas
that were subject to the general amending procedure, but did not provide the right to opt out. 119 This section related to the following matters: "the principle of proportionate representation of the provinces in
the House of Commons," 120 the powers of and the selection of the
Senate, 121 the number of members a province is entitled to have represent it in the Senate, 122 the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, 123 "the extension of existing provinces into the territories" 124 and
"the establishment of new provinces." 12s Quebec objected to not having a veto over any amendments affecting these areas. It maintained
that changes to these, the most fundamental aspects of Canadian federalism, should not be made without the consent of all the provinces
114. See Unfinished Compromise, supra note 100, at 269. Hon. Gil Remillard, the Minister of Justice in Quebec, said the compromise was unacceptable because it was incomplete.
115. See MAJORIE M. BoWKER, THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD WHAT IT WILL MEAN TO
You AND CANADA: AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS 10 (1990).
116. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, pt. V (Procedure for Amending Constitution
of Canada), § 38(1). This is commonly referred to as the "seven-fifty formula."
117. Id. § 38(3).
118. Id. § 40.
119. Id. § 42(1).
120. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, § 42(1)(a).
121. Id. § 42(1)(b).
122. Id. § 42(1)(c).
123. Id. § 42(1)(d).
124. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 86, § 42(1)(e).
125. Id. § 42(1)(f).
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as the new amending formula would allow . 126 Nine other provinces,
however, accepted the proposal and the new constitutional amendments were formally incorporated into Canadian constitutional law
when the Canada Act, 1982, 127 including the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, was presented to and approved by the British Parliament
and received Royal assent on April 17, 1982. 128 Thus, a new amending procedure was introduced into the Canadian Constitution without
Quebec's consent, thereby ending the U.K.'s colonial involvement in
Canada. 129
The underlying problem with the implementation of this constitutional framework was that it was not accepted by all the provinces.
This flaw conflicts with the fundamental concept of the legitimacy of
constitutional law. 13° Constitutional law must be both socially and
politically legitimate. The fact that a majority of provinces accepted
this amending procedure makes it legal, but not legitimate. 131 Thus,
the job of final patriation will not be completed until a constitutional
framework acceptable to all the provinces is created. The Meech
Lake Accord was drafted to create a federal order under which all the
provinces could agree. However, just like many of the previous proposals, it failed to be ratified by all the provinces.

III.

THE MEECH LAKE ACCORD: THE LATEST STAGE OF
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Canada's constitutional development began its latest chapter on
April 30, 1987, when a First Ministers' Meeting ended at Meech
Lake, Quebec. 132 Canada's current Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney,
moved to try to address the needs of French-speaking Quebec and
have those needs included in the Constitution Act, 1867. The conference produced the Meech Lake Accord, 133 signed by all the provincial
and the federal leaders. 134 Quebec agreed to sign the Constitution Act
126. See Unfinished Compromise, supra note 100, at 277 - 78.
127. Canada Act, R.S.C., Appendices (No. 44)(1985XCan.).
128. Id.
129. See Ray Romanow, "Reworking the Miracle'~· The Constitutional Accord 1981, 8
QUEEN'S L.J. 74 (1982).
130. See Richard S. Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States,
7 CAN. U.S. L.J. 111, 120 - 23 (1984).
131. Id. Quebec never formally passed the resolution to adopt the Constitution Act,
1982.
132. See ACCORD, supra note l, at preface. The actual text of the Meech Lake Accord
was drafted on June 3, 1987 at a second meeting in Ottawa. Id.
133. For full text with annotations see ACCORD, supra note 1.
134. See FIRST MINISTERS' MEETING ON THE CONSTITUTION, APR. 30, 1987, reprinted
in 17 MANITOBA L.J. 107 (1987). The goal, as stated in the Draft Statement of Principles, was
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in exchange for the incorporation of the Accord into the
constitution. 13s
Quebec's Minister of Justice, Gil Remillard, was given authority
to inform the provinces and the federal government of the prerequisites necessary for Quebec's support of the 1982 amendments to the
Constitution Act, 1867. In May 1986, he outlined five conditions: 1)
explicit recognition of Quebec as a distinct society; 2) a guarantee of
increased powers in immigration matters; 3) limitation of federal
spending power; 4) recognition of a right to veto proposed amendments; and 5) Quebec's participation in the appointment of judges to
the Supreme Court of Canada.136

A.

The Accord's Impact on Canada's Existing Constitutional Order

The amendments to the Constitution Act, 1867 contained in the
Accord specifically addressed Quebec's demands. Additionally, the
seventeen sections included in the Accord made several other changes
to the existing constitutional framework. First and foremost, it would
have granted the francophone province special status as a "distinct
society." 137 Clause 1 of the Accord would have added a new section 2
to the Constitution Act, 1867 which would have provided:
The Constitution of Canada shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with (a) the recognition that the existence of French-speaking
Canadians, centered in Quebec but also present elsewhere in Canada,
and English-speaking Canadians, concentrated outside Quebec but
also present in Quebec, constitutes a fundamental characteristic of
Canada; and (b) the recognition that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society. 13s

This provision adds that the "role of the Parliament of Canada and
the provincial legislatures to preserve the fundamental characteristic
of Canada referred to [above] is affirmed." 139 Significantly, the next
paragraph explicitly affirms that it is the role of the legislature and
Government of Quebec to "preserve and promote the distinct
to transform the Meech Lake Accord into the 1987 Constitutional Accord, an amendment to
the Constitution Act, 1867. Id.
135. See Gil Remillard, Quebec's Quest for Survival and Equality Via the Meech Lake
Accord, in THE MEECH LAKE PRIMER: CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCORD 28 (Michael D. Behiels ed. 1989) [hereinafter MEECH LAKE PRIMER].
136. Id. at 29.
137. See ACCORD, supra note 1, cl. 1, at 11 (proposed new§ 2 to the Constitution Act,
1867).
138. See id.
139. Id. cl. 1, para. 2.
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identity." 140
The "distinct society" clause gives something to Quebec that is
not given to any other province. It has the ability to "preserve and
promote" while the other provinces can only "preserve.'' Questions
have been raised about the meaning of this clause and its significance
in light of the unique powers Quebec possessed under the pre-existing
constitutional order. 141 One constitutional scholar, Professor Peter
W. Hogg, believes that while it could be argued that this is a new
grant of power, the better view is that this section merely recognizes
existing powers. 142 He adds, however, that although this clause may
only be symbolic, the Accord contains several other sections that give
"concrete expression" to the notion of a distinct society. 143
The sections concerning immigration, 144 Senate reform, 14s federal spending 146 and Canadian Supreme Court appointments 147 illustrate the power Quebec would have had to promote its distinctness
under the Accord. The Accord would have added five sections covering immigration to the Constitution Act, 1867.148 The new scheme
would have obligated the Canadian federal government to negotiate
an agreement relating to immigration with any province making a request.149 Such agreement would gain constitutional status when executed in accordance with the paragraphs of this section. 1so The end
result would have guaranteed Quebec the ability to participate in the
selection of individuals taking up permanent or temporary residence
within its territory.
In addition to immigration, the Accord would have "constitutionalized" Quebec's representation on the Supreme Court of Canada.1s 1 The BNA Act, 1867 did not provide a court of last appeal in
Canada, rather the right of appeal was to the British Privy Council.
The Supreme Court now in existence was established by federal statute in 1875. 1s2 The new sections in the Accord would have explicitly
140. Id. cl. 1, para. 2(3) (emphasis added).
141. See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 12 - 13.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 21.
145. ACCORD, supra note 1, at 15.
146. Id. at 35.
147. See id. els. 4 & 5, at 27 (proposed new sub-headings and sections to Constitution
Act, 1987, §§ 101A - 101E).
148. See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 104, § 95.
149. See ACCORD, supra note 1, cl. 3 at 21 (new § 95A).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 32.
152. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. ch. S - 19 (Canada 1970).
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placed the Supreme Court in the constitution of Canada for the first
time.m
These sections would have also established the criteria for the
appointment of Supreme Court judges. Significantly for Quebec, one
paragraph specifically provided that "[a]t least three judges of the
Supreme Court of Canada shall be appointed from among persons
who, after having been admitted to the bar of Quebec, have, for a total
of ten years, been judges of any court of Quebec or of any court established by the Parliament of Canada, or members of the bar of Quebec." 1s4 The appointments under this section could have only been
made from names of persons submitted by the Government of
Quebec.1ss
The Accord also reformed the Senate which was one of Quebec's
demands 1s6 for joining the Constitution Act, 1867. Appointments to
the Senate were, and still are today, made solely on the advice of the
federal cabinet by the Governor General. 1s7 The Accord would have
limited appointments to individuals whose names had been submitted
by the province from which the Senate vacancy was created.iss The
effect of this would have been to transfer the power to choose representation in Ottawa from the federal level to the provincial level,
thereby achieving more effective representation.
Similarly, Quebec's demand for limitation on federal spending
was addressed by the Accord. Section 7 provided:
The Government of Canada shall provide reasonable compensation
to the government of a province that chooses not to participate in a
national shared-cost program that is established by the Government
of Canada after the coming into force of this section in an area of
exclusive provincial jurisdiction, if the province carries on a program
or initiative that is compatible with the national objectives. 1s9

This section would have allowed provinces to opt out of national
shared-cost programs established by the federal government. It
would have changed the existing scheme by providing "reasonable
compensation" to any province that did not take part in such a program, but developed its own initiative "compatible with the national
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 31.
Id. at 27 (new § 101B(2)).
Id. at 28 (new § 101C(3)).
See Quebec's demands discussed supra text part II.
Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 104, § 24.
ACCORD, supra note 1, cl. 2 (new § 25).
Id. at 37, cl. 7. (new § 106A(l)).
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objectives." 160
One of the most significant changes the Accord would have made
to satisfy Quebec was the procedure to amend the constitution. As
previously discussed, 161 this issue had been one of the most controversial aspects of constitutional change in Canada throughout the twentieth century, and was one of the reasons Quebec did not sign the
Canada Act, 1982.1 6 2
The Constitution Act, 1867 provides the existing procedure for
amending the constitution. Currently, a province can opt out of a
constitutional amendment and receive reasonable compensation when
the change deals with education or other cultural matters. 163 The Accord would have expanded this right to any amendment from which a
province opted out.
Additionally, under the existing amending scheme, changes affecting the Senate, the House of Commons, the Supreme Court and
the extension and creation of new provinces were subject to the
"seven-fifty formula." 164 The proposed changes in the Accord would
have required changes to these categories to receive provincial unanimity. Thus, Quebec, as well as any other province, would have had
a veto over changes to these fundamental areas of the federation.
Along with a provision calling for an annual constitutional conference of First Ministers, 165 these were the changes proposed by the
Accord that were to satisfy Quebec and encourage it to sign the Constitution Act, 1867. In accordance with the Constitution Act, 1867
amending procedure, the Accord had to be ratified by all ten provincial legislatures within three years to become part of the Canadian
Constitution. 166 The Accord became the center of national debate
during this time period, but ultimately failed to become law due to
lack of provincial approval on June 23, 1990.

B.

The Accord's Ratification Process

The Accord was sent to the legislatures of every province for approval of the amendment in hopes of firmly placing it into Canadian
constitutional law. The process of provincial acceptance was long and
drawn out. The Accord itself was criticized by politicians, constitu160. Id.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See discussion supra text part 11.B.
See discussion supra text part 11.D.
Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 104, § 40.
See supra note 116.
ACCORD, supra note 1, cl. 8 (new§ 50).
See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 104, §§ 39(2), 41.
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tional experts, academics and citizens. 167 Some provinces felt that the
Accord ceded too many powers to the provinces,1 68 while others, especially Quebec, faulted it for not giving enough powers to the provincial governments. Women's groups denounced it for not reaffirming
principles of sexual equality. 169 Finally, because it was drafted by a
small group of leaders without effective open public debate, scholars
criticized its lack of democratic process. 170
On June 23, 1987, Quebec's legislative assembly approved the
Accord as did the Saskatchewan assembly three months later. 171
While other provinces debated, it seemed certain that final legitimate
patriation, which would include Quebec, was inevitable. Nonetheless,
as the June 23, 1990, deadline drew near, the future of the Accord
became less certain. The Canadian political agenda was almost exclusively devoted to the constitutional problem. In Newfoundland, Manitoba and New Brunswick, the legislatures decided they would not
sign the Accord unless certain modifications were introduced. 172 On
June 3, 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney called all the provincial Prime
Ministers to Ottawa for negotiations. In trying to resolve the concerns of the provinces, Mulroney placed considerable pressure on the
undecided provincial leaders to ratify the Accord.
The Federal government, sensing that the provinces would not
ratify in time for the deadline, announced they would apply to the
Canadian Supreme Court for a time extension. The Prime Minister of
Newfoundland described this as the "final manipulation" and adjourned the Newfoundland House of Assembly without a vote on the
Accord.17 3 On the eve of June 23, 1990, adoption was formally
blocked in the Province of Manitoba. 174 The end result was the col167. See generally MEECH LAKE PRIMER, supra note 135; Bryan Schwartz, Fathoming
Meech Lake, 17 MANITOBA L.J. 1 (1987).
168. See Gerard Beaudoin, Constitutionalizing Quebec's Protection at the Supreme Court
and in the Senate, in MEECH LAKE PRIMER, supra note 135, at 385. The proponents of this
argument complained that the Accord would provincialize federal institutions. For example,
the Supreme Court of Canada would be influenced because the Accord gave Quebec the right
to have three of the judges appointed from their province. See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 27 28, § 101(bX2); discussion supra text part III.A.
169. See Mary Eberts, The Constitution, The Charter and the Distinct Society Clause:
Why are Women Being Ignored?, in MEECH LAKE PRIMER, supra note 135, at 302.
170. See Bryan Schwartz, Refashioning Meech Lake, 18 MANITOBA L.J. 19, 20 (1989).
See also Alan C. Cairns, Citizens and Their Charter: Democratizing the Process of Constitutional Reform, in MEECH LAKE PRIMER, supra note 135, at 109.
171. See ACCORD, supra note 1, at 1.
172. See THE EcoNOMIST, July 18, 1990 (Country Report).
173. See John F. Bums, Canadian Leader Appeals For Calm On Quebec Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1990, § 1, at 1.
174. See Mary Walsh, Elijah Harper Stands Out As A Chief Among Canada's Indians,
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lapse of the Accord. Thus, Canada is left without a constitution incorporating all of the provinces under one unified constitutional
framework.
C.

Canada's Constitutional Development After the Failure of the
Meech Lake Accord

The Premier of Quebec, the leader of Quebec's Liberal Party,
Robert Bourassa, announced, on the day following the collapse of the
Accord, that Quebec would carry on as a "distinct society," capable
of assuming its own development. 11s He added that his government
would not .take part in any more multilateral talks, only bilateral negotiations with the Federal government. Bourassa and Jacques
Parizeau, leader of the P. Q., have taken action by initiating a law that
established a commission to determine the future of Quebec. 176 The
Quebec Commission, 177 also known as the Belanger-Campeau Commission, 178 is comprised of thirty-six leaders from different sectors of
Quebec. 179 The Quebec Commission is dominated by economists, but
has given priority to cultural, political and strategic considerations. 180
Analysts following the activities of the Quebec Commission feel that
it is trying to answer two questions. 181 First, what powers are required for Quebec to preserve and promote its distinctiveness? 182 Second, what process should be established in order to attain those
powers? 183
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1990, part H, at 2. In the Manitoba legislature, Elijah Harper, the only
native Indian in Manitoba's Assembly, successfully blocked the passage of the Accord. By
using political knowledge and strategy he accomplished what no one in Canada thought was
possible. He said "no" to Prime Minister Mulroney and the constitutional Accord. His feat
sparked a feeling of pride in the Indian population of Canada which began a chain reaction of
political unrest throughout the nation's Indian territories. The thrust of their objection was
based on the fact that they had been left out of the constitutional amendment process. Id.
175. See John F. Bums, Canadian Leader Appeals for Calm on Quebec Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1990, § 1, at 1.
176. See Laforest, supra note 9.
177. Id. at 106.
178. Named after the co-chairpersons who lead the Commission, Jean Campeau and
Michel Belanger. Id. at 104.
179. Shortly after the collapse of the Accord, the Premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa,
formed a committee on the future of Quebec. The job, given to economists and business leaders, is to recommend a plan for the future direction of the province. Many have speculated
that this could be a proposal to move for sovereignty as an independent nation distinct from
Canada. See Frank Perrotta, Two Businessman on Quebec Panel, BoSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26,
1990, at AS.
180. See Laforest, supra note 9, at 107.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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The Quebec Commission reported its findings to Quebec's Parliament in March 1991 and recommended that it pass a law requiring a
provincial referendum on sovereignty. 184 The provincial government
introduced legislation that would call for a vote on Quebec's future no
later than October 1992. 18' It also proposed that, during this interim
period, proposals from the rest of Canada should be reviewed to decide what should be on the ballot when Quebec's citizens decide their
future constitutional order.186
Separatist sentiments in Quebec are at an all-time high after the
other provinces rejected the Accord and Quebec. 187 Based on action
taken by the Quebec government, some critics feel that the federal
structure that has existed in Canada from 1867 through 1982 is now
"dead." 188 Disenchantment with the pre-existing federal system is
giving way to a distinct Quebec nationalism. Meanwhile, the other
provinces are also calling for changes in Canada's federal order. 189
Western provinces, sensing the federal government's favoritism towards Quebec, are also calling for changes in the federal arrangement.190 Aboriginal groups, 191 as well as the Territories, are pushing
for greater representation in any process that leads to the creation of a
new Canadian structure. 192
Similarly, dissatisfaction with existing constitutional organizations is also occurring in the former Soviet Union, India, Yugoslavia,
and Czechoslovakia. 193 This trend, which has been referred to as "re184. See Quebec Government Introduces Referendum Bill, REUTERS REP., May IS, 1991,
(Money Report).
185. Id.
186. Id. See also Peter M. Leslie, Options for the Future of Canada: the Good, Bad and
the Fantastic, in OPTIONS, supra note 1, at 123. The author undertakes a general discussion of
the spectrum of options that may come before the Commission.
187. See, e.g., PIERRE BoURGAULT, Now OR NEVER! MANIFESTO FOR AN INDEPENDENT QUEBEC (David Homel trans. 1991 ). Pierre Bourgault, a long time advocate of Quebec
sovereignty, outlines his vision for an independent Quebec.
188. See Laforest, supra note 9, at 103.
189. See A Survey of Canada, THE EcONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at 4, 14.
190. See William Clairbome, Canada's Western Provinces Want More Independence,· Failure Of Meech Lake Accord Set Stage For Provincial Leaders' Call For Increase In Regionalism,
WASH. POST, July 28, 1990, § 1, at A12. The provincial leaders of British Columbia, Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan seek a "blueprint for the new realities of the 1990s." Id. In
response to a perceived federal bias, they are proposing to collect their taxes regionally. This
would give them greater control over public spending and increase their autonomy from Ottawa. Id.
191. See David C. Hawkes & Bradford W. Morse, Alternative Methods for Aboriginal
Participation in Processes of Constitutional Reform, in OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 163.
192. Id.
193. See Small Wonder Foreigners Fear for Canada It'll Take More than Derek Burney's
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gional self-determination," 194 reflects the reality that individuals do
not easily renounce their national identities, and will resist attempts to
homogenize their communities into large collective or federal bodies.19s However, while federal unions are breaking down throughout
the world, in Europe, national distinctiveness has been reconciled
with universalism. 196 The politically, socially, and culturally diverse
member states of the European Union have joined together under one
common legal order. This supposed pre-federal system has been developing and integrating slowly since the Treaty of Paris was signed in
1951. The experience of the European Union member states offers
Canada a possible model to solve its constitutional crisis.
IV.

THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The way in which the diverse nations of the European Union
came together and agreed on a legal framework has broad implications for a method of constitutional change. Born out of economic
need, it has developed slowly over time, enlarging and integrating its
laws and institutions. It is not a uniform legal structure, rather it is
comprised of three separate elements. First, the member states economic policies are bound under the treaties of the EC. Second, separate from the framework of the EC and its institutions, the member
states cooperate at an inter-governmental level in the areas of foreign
policy and security. Finally, the member states also have undertaken
inter-governmental cooperation in police matters. The result is not a
strict federal constitutional structure but in many ways the members
states have become a constitutionally organized entity that was not
established by one all-encompassing document.
The present status of the European Union's fundamental institutions, its structural organization and distribution of political and legal
pewer are unique to the experience of its member states. While it is
instructive for Canada to examine the European Union as it exists
today, to make a useful comparison, the origins and evolution of the
European Union must also be analyzed.
Bravado to Convince World We're not Just Another Fragmenting Federation, TORONTO STAR,
July 13, 1991, (Insight) at 04.
194. See supra note 14.
195. See Laforest, supra note 9, at 112 (citing K. Minogue & B. Williams, Ethnic Conflict
in the Soviet Union: the Revenge of Particularism, in A. MOTYL BUILDING BRIDGES: SOVIET
NATIONALITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1990)).
196. Id. at 113.
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Historical Background of the European Union and the EC's
Fundamental Principles

Political events in the late 1940s increased the likelihood of a
third war between Eastern and Westem powers. The collapse of the
Moscow Conference in 1947 concerning the future of Germany, the
Prague Coup in 1948 and the Berlin Blockade in 1948 all combined to
raise tensions. A call for immediate action to resolve the growing
political tension between the East and West was rendered obsolete
when the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb in 1949.1 97
At the center of this post-World War II crisis was the status of
Federal Germany. The traditional rivalry between France and Germany and the threat of future confrontation had to be reconciled. To
ensure that Germany would not have the ability to re-militarize, the
economic factors of a war machine, steel and coal, had to be dealt
with. The United States had developed the Marshall Plan to return
economic health to the war-tom "olde world" economy. 198 Additionally, the formation of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) made some type of an agreement between France
and Germany, as well as the other European states inevitable.
In 1950, the Foreign Minister of France, Robert Schuman, devised a plan to integrate Germany and other western European states
into one economic federation. This plan was revolutionary in that it
did not seek to merely maintain an equilibrium of interests, but to
"fus[e] the interests of the European peoples . . . ." 199 The Schuman
Plan sought to achieve this goal and maintain peace through four fundamental principles which continue to guide the EC today.
First, Schuman proposed an order where the common institutions were superior to those of the individual member states. 200 Recognition of this principle would ensure that democratic and peaceful
relations between the States would prevail. It would also replace nationalistic and domineering attitudes with an era of cooperation between the States based on common interests.
Second, the governing institutions had to have the power to execute their functions for the collective. 201 Procedures were to be established to ensure that the individuals operating the institutions were
197. See PASCAL FONTAINE, EUROPE - A FRESH START: THE SCHUMAN DECLARATION 1950 - 90, 9 (1990) [hereinafter SCHUMAN DECLARATION]. This event marked the end
of East-West dialogue and the beginning of the Cold War. Id.
198. See MATHUSEN 5th, supra note 17, at 6.
199. ScHUMAN DECLARATION, supra note 197, at 17 (quoting Jean Monnet's MEMOIRS).
200. Id. at 19.
201. Id.
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not national delegates. They would have an allegiance to the new federation and act independently for the benefit of all the States.
Cooperation between the independent institutions and member
states was the aim of the third principle. The institutions would be
affecting the macroeconomic policies of the member states. Because
these are normally matters of concern for each state's government,
they would have to allow the states to defend their national interests
to ensure the independence of the institutions. The institution created
would necessarily allow member states to exercise their interest in a
limited manner. Therefore, cooperation between the governing institutions would ensure that individual member interests were recognized, but that the common interest would prevail. 202
Finally, given the principle of states' representation discussed
above, the principle of equality among states was established. 203 This
would eliminate discrimination and domination of larger states over
smaller states. The progress of the new union would not be impeded
by a requirement of unanimous consent or influenced by proportional
representation. Thus, equality for all member states in each new institution was placed into the newly emerging European order.

B.

ECSC - The First Community

On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman took his plan from concept to
reality by proposing the European Steel and Coal Community204
(ECSC) as the "first stage of European Federation. " 205 This Treaty
became the first common legal order between the original member
states of the EC. It called for a change in control over French and
German coal and steel production from national authorities to a high
authority that was only responsible to the Community. The threat of
war would be removed through joint control over the major inputs of
war: steel and coal. The proposed Community would adhere to the
basic principles of the Schuman Plan.
Germany agreed to the proposal and began negotiations with
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy. 206 In
202. Id. at 20 - 21.
203. ScHUMAN DECLARATION, supra note 197, at 21 - 22.
204. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 16.
205. See P.S.R.F. MATHUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 6 (4th ed.
1985) [hereinafter MATHUSEN 4th].
206. The United Kingdom was asked to join in the negotiations, but the concept of a
High Authority was viewed as inconsistent with the principle of parliamentary supremacy in
Britain. See Peter Herzog, The European Communities: A Model for a Settlement in the Middle East?, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 509, 512 (1987).
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Paris, on April 18, 1951, the Treaty establishing the ECSC was signed
by the six member nations (the Six). 207 Approximately one year later,
on July 25, 1952, the national parliaments of each member state ratified the ECSC and placed the development of the EC in motion. 208
The result was that all barriers to trade in coal and steel between the
Six were abolished by 1953.
The Treaty creating the ECSC is considered to be the first instrument of European integration. 209 Its most important characteristic is
its "supra-national" construction. 210 This was not another inter-governmental organization, but a "quasi-federation" concerning one economic area with the signatory states retaining their sovereignty over
everything else. 211
Institutionally, the ECSC was comprised of a High Authority, 212
a Council of Ministers, 213 an Assembly214 and a Court of Justice. 21 s
The High Authority was the executive body whose management decisions concerning the steel and coal industry were binding on the
member states. The function of the Council was to harmonize the
national economies in the steel and coal markets. 216 Limited political
control was focused in the Assembly. The Court's role was to monitor the application of the ECSC Treaty and review the High Authority's decisions. 217 Thus, the establishment of the ECSC was proof that
in spite of diverse national interests a supra-national structure was a
viable means of unifying sovereign states. 218

C.

The Early Setbacks of the EC

In response to historical events of the time, the Six endeavored to
take steps to develop the Community. The Korean War, which had
begun in June 1950, and the cold war tension between the West and
the emerging Soviet Bloc had focused the attention of member states
on the formation of a common defense community. However, by
April 27, 1952, when the Treaty establishing the European Defense
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See ECSC Treaty, supra note 16.
See MATHUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 7.
See LASOK, supra note 18, at 12.
Id.
Id.
See ECSC Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 8 - 19.
Id. arts. 26 - 30.
Id. arts. 20 - 25.
Id. arts. 31 - 45.
See LASOK, supra note 18, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
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Community was signed, the international political scene had eased
with the death of Stalin, only to ease further the following year with
the end of the Korean war. 219 In light of these developments any
notion of abandoning national military forces appeared too extreme a
measure. The Treaty was signed and ratified by five members, but
was rejected by the French National Assembly on August 31, 1954. 220
This reluctance to transfer control to the EC dissolved any chance of
forming a European Political Community Treaty that had not even
been signed yet, but was proposed. 221
Despite these setbacks, integration of the member nations moved
ahead. The future proposals were less ambitious and were not elevated to the same level as the previous proposals. This is one of the
characteristics which has led to the successful development of the EC.
When one proposal is not acceptable to the member nations, instead
of trying to redraft another proposal on the same scale, the group
takes a step back and seeks a more modest approach towards
integration.

D.

EEC and Euratom

The next step toward integration was formally taken in 1955
when the idea of a common market and the joint development of
transportation and energy was submitted to the Foreign Ministers of
the member states. 222 As a result, the Six signed the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community223 (EEC) and the Treaty establishing The European Atomic Energy Community224 (Euratom) in
219. See MATHUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 7.
220. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 514. See also EDWARD FURSDON, THE EUROPEAN
DEFENSE COMMUNITY, A HISTORY 295 - 97 (1980).
221. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 514.
222. The general proposals were approved at a conference of Foreign Ministers in Messina, Sicily in June of 1955. The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, was
given the job of reporting with a feasibility study known as the "Spaak Report." At this time
again an invitation to join the community was made to the United Kingdom, once again they
did not accept. See H. HEISER, BRITISH POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE UNIFICATION EFFORTS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT 96 (1959). See also 1 HANS SMIT & PETER HERZOG,
THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC
TREATY P5 - P6 (1990).
223. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-COMMISSION, TREATIES EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 115 (abr. ed. 1987) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
224. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 44 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIESCOMMISSION, TREATIES EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 385 (abr. ed. 1987)
[hereinafter Euratom Treaty].
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Rome on March 25, 1957.
A distinction between the three existing treaties was apparent.
ECSC and Euratom, were viewed as sectoral. 225 In contrast, the principal function of the EEC was to establish a common market and the
progressive approximation of the economic policies of the member nations through "harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between
the states belonging to it. "226
The foundation of the development was based on four basic principles adopted by each member nation. These are: ( 1) free movement
of goods between the member states; 227 (2) a common agricultural
policy; 228 (3) the free movement of persons, 229 services230 and capital231; and (4) a series of common policies. 232 While the EEC Treaty
promotes commonality in these areas, it left subject to each member
state, the harmonization of these policies. 233

E.

Integration and Enlargement

Although the three treaties, ECSC, EEC and Euratom, were executed in the same manner as traditional international agreements between sovereign states, the drafters were aware that they were
creating something very different from traditional international
law. 234 The EC Treaties create their own legal system based on fundamental principles upon which the development of a modem consti225. The two treaties were drafted to integrate specific sectors or markets common to the
member states. See MATHUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 108.
226. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 2.
227. Id. arts. 9 - 37.
228. Id. arts. 38 - 47.
229. Id. arts. 48 - 51.
230. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 59 - 66.
231. Id. arts. 52 - 58, (7 - 73).
232. Id. arts. 74 - 84.
233. The member states are obligated to ensure their policies maintain an overall equilibrium in the balance of payments, confidence in currency, stable prices and high employment,
all areas of common concern. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 103 - 09.
234. See MATHUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 1. In international law, sovereign states
enter into agreements that create mutual obligations. In contrast, the states that signed the EC
Treaties limited their own sovereign rights by transferring them to institutions over which they
have no direct control, and endowed them with powers they will not always possess themselves. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 513. Professor Herzog noted in passing that "in spite of
the somewhat technical language the drafters viewed this as much more than just a regulation
of an industry. They hoped it would provide the basis for a future of closer cooperation among
the peoples of Europe . ... " Id.
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tutional framework can be established. 235
F.

Merger of the Three Communities

The next major transformation in the composition of the EC was
the adoption of the Merger Treaty on April 8, 1965. 236 This agreement merged the communities in fact, though not from a strictly legal
point of view, by placing them all under the control of common
institutions. 237
Originally, the ECSC was guided by a supra-national High Authority with wide regulatory and administrative powers over the
member states and individual firms. 238 In contrast, the EEC and
Euratom were less supra-national than the ECSC. For example,the
EEC Treaty created a Commission as the executive rather than a
High Authority. 239 Its independent decision-making powers were
much narrower than were those given to the ECSC High
Authority. 240
The Merger Treaty provided for one Commission, 241 one Council
of Ministers, 242 one European Parliament243 and one European Court
of Justice for all three Communities. 244 The Commission, sitting in
Brussels, is composed of seventeen members who hold office for four
235. The law was originally termed "supra-national." The reasoning was that all member states had to apply Community law over their domestic law, and that law was common to
all member states. See MATHUSEN 4th, supra note 205, at 2.
236. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, April 8, 1965 in force July 1, 1967 reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 776 (1965) [hereinafter
Merger Treaty].
237. See MATHUSEN 5th, supra note 17, at 8.
238. The High Authority was comprised of nine independent personalities appointed by
the governments of the Six. It consulted a Council of Ministers composed of representatives of
the member state's government for consent on certain acts. The High Authority was controlled judicially by the Court of Justice. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 7 - 19.
239. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 4(1); Euratom Treaty, supra note 224, art. 3(1).
240. The distinction between the two is apparent from the nature of the treaties. The
ECSC was a treaty-law (traite-regles) which enumerated rules for every situation and thus the
High Authority's discretion could not be expanded. In contrast, the EEC treaty is an outline
treaty (traite-cadre) which sets out broad principles which the legislative body it created would
have to enact upon from time to time. See Giancarlo Olmi, The ECSC the First European
Federal Structure, in THIRTY YEARS, supra note 21, at 2.
241. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 155 - 63.
242. See Merger Treaty, supra note 236, arts. 1 - 8; EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 145
- 54.
243. See Merger Treaty, supra note 236, arts. 9 - 19; EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts.
137 - 44.
244. See Merger Treaty, supra note 236, art. 30; EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 164 88.
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years and are chosen by mutual agreement of the member states. 245
The role of the Commission is to be the "initiator and co-coordinator
of Community policy; it is the executive agency of the Community; it
is the guardian of the Community Treaties. " 246
A representative from each member state sits on the Council of
Ministers. 247 The Council meets periodically, normally in Brussels or
Luxembourg. 248 The voting rules of the Council vary according to
the subject matter being discussed, but its principal role is as the legislative body of the EC. It enacts legislation, subject to the powers of
the Commission and European Parliament, and "ensure[s] coordination of the general economic policies of the member states. " 249
The Assembly, or European Parliament, consists of representatives from each member state. The 518 representatives are elected by
direct universal suffrage. 250 Although this body has no direct legislative powers, it does have the power to affect proposals in certain instances when acting in cooperation with the Council and
Commission. 251 The European Parliament has three months to approve, amend, or reject proposals submitted to it by the Council. 252
Proposals. may be sent back to the Commission for re-examination. 253
However, there is no binding force behind opinions issued or amendments proposed by the Parliament. 254 In contrast, the European Parliament has the power to amend and the sole power to approve the
annual budget of the EC. 2 ss
The Court of Justice also sits in Luxembourg and is composed of
thirteen judges256 and six advocate generals. 257 In general, the Court
is a catalyst for integration by ensuring that EC law takes effect
within each member state's legal system. 258 The Court can hear dis245. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 158.
246. See LASOK, supra note 18, at 112.
247. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 146.
248. Id. art. 147.
249. Id. art. 145.
250. Id. art. 138(3). France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. have 81 representatives; Spain
60, Netherlands 25, Belgium, Portugal, and Greece 24, Denmark 16, Ireland 15 and Luxembourg 6. Id. art. 138(2).
251. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 149(2).
252. Id.
253. Id. art. 149(2)(d).
254. See MATHIJSEN 5th, supra note 17, at 22.
255. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 203.
256. Id. art. 165.
257. See id. art. 166.
258. The Court of Justice has ruled that Community law must take direct effect in member states and become part of the national law. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] CMLR 105.
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putes between states, citizens and corporations concerning EC law. 2 s9
Therefore, the EC is comprised of three distinct legal communities
established by separate treaties all operating under one legal order. 260
At the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, a timetable of
twelve years was set as the transitional period for creating a common
market in all sectors of the economy. 261 Economic prosperity in the
early sixties put the Six ahead of schedule. In December 1964, the
Commission moved to adopt a plan for rapid development of a single
market. It was proposed that the EC finance all expenditures on a
common agricultural policy, reform EC financial arrangements and
strengthen the power of the European Parliament. 262
However, the strengthening of the EC institutions was not acceptable to all member nations. Specifically, in June 1965, France refused to take its Council seat because agricultural policy talks were
deadlocked. 263 This action prevented the Council from making any
r
further decisions.
The conflict was resolved in Janu~ 1966 by the "Luxembourg
Compromise. " 264 The member states appeased France's objection to
the proposed changes to the EC, especially their worries over majority
voting on subjects that affected vital interests of member nations. 26s
The other countries agreed they would try to obtain unanimous consent on all future decisions. 266
The Community continued to progress in spite of these set-backs.
Guided by the principles of the Schuman Plan, the Community leaders focused on coordinating the sovereign power which each member
state had transferred to the EC into one harmonious federation. This
259. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 530.
260. The citizens living in a member state refer to the three legally distinct communities
as the "European Community." Therefore, it was decided by the European Parliament and
the Council that the term "European Community" would be used on all official documents
except for legislation whenever possible and appropriate. See Resolution of 16 February 1978
on a Single Designation for the Community, 63 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. 13.3) 36 (1978).
261. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 8. See SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 222, at 1 111 to 1 - 113 (discussing the so-called acceleration decisions and a general background to art.
8).

262. See THIRTY YEARS, supra note 21, at 5.
263. Id.
264. Luxembourg Compromise reprinted in 3 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 469 (1966). See
also Herzog, supra note 206, at 517.
265. See THIRTY YEARS, supra note 21, at 5.
266. Id. Although not a fully binding agreement, the effort to obtain unanimous consent
on future decisions became the common practice of the Council and is known as the Luxembourg Compromise. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 518 - 19.
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approach has allowed the diverse member states of the EC to advance
with unanimous consent.
This positive move forward was enhanced by subsequent meetings between the leaders of the governments of the member states,
beginning in December 1969. During this Summit Conference at the
Hague, it was decided that the respective Foreign Ministers would
study potential steps to achieve political unification and consider ways
to enlarge the EC. 261
The product of these meetings was the first report of the Foreign
Ministers. 268 According to this report, the plan called for cooperation
and consultation between member states who were to harmonize their
policies and encourage joint action. This report also laid the foundation for a system calling for the Foreign Ministers to meet four times
a year in political cooperation outside the strict framework of the
EEC Treaty, thereby enhancing the ability of the EC to speak with
one voice on common issues. 269

G.

The First Enlargement

On January 22, 1972·, the Treaty of Brussels concerning the accession of United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway was
signed. 270 This Treaty and the appended Act concerning the accession of the new members modified the existing Treaties to address the
problems created by the accession of new member states to the EC. 271
The institutions were adapted to assimilate the new members, and
transitional arrangements were implemented to allow for smooth integration. 272 The Treaty of Brussels was ratified by the governments of
Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom, but not Norway. 273
Thus, by 1973 the EC had nine member nations.
Throughout the seventies, the European Union was faced with
economic hardship. The oil embargo of 1972 by OPEC and the
destabilization of the U.S. dollar caused market shocks that put EC
267. See SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 222, at P - 11.
268. Adopted October 27, 1970. Id.
269. Decided at the Paris Summit, October, 1972. Id. at P - 12.
270. Treaty of Brussels, Jan. 22, 1972, in force Jan. 1, 1973, reprinted in TREATIES EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: TREATIES AMENDING THESE TREATIES ( 1978).
271. See MATHUSEN 5th, supra note 17, at 10.
272. See THIRTY YEARS, supra note 21, at 7.
273. In a May election, 83% of the Irish voters said "yes." In September 1972, 63.5% of
the Danish electorate said "yes" and in October the House of Commons in Britain passed the
European Communities Act by a wide majority. Notably 53% of the Norwegians voting on
the referendum said "no." Id.
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members on economic alert. 274 However, the European Union remained one cohesive entity throughout this period of serious economic hardship.
Greece applied for membership on June 12, 1975, and after conditions for accession were formalized, it became the tenth member in
January 1981. 21 s Portugal and Spain applied for membership in 1977.
The Treaty of Accession and Act concerning the conditions of accession was concluded in Madrid on June 12, 1985, and were effective
January 1, 1986. 276 The EC now consists of twelve member states.

H.

The Single European Act and "1992"

In the early eighties, a downturn in the world economy affected
EC progress. Some members were unhappy with the way the EC was
carrying out the financing and distribution of funds. Other members
were concerned with increasing Community expenditures and a corresponding downturn in revenues. 277 The European Parliament, recognizing the need for greater political unity, proposed a draft Treaty for
a European Union in 1984. 278 Additionally, the Commission issued a
"White Paper" on the completion of the EC internal market. 279 Together these two documents represented movement toward completion of a single internal market set for December 31, 1992. 280
The result of this push forward was the Single European Act281
designed to implement institutional changes to the EC which would
facilitate further harmonization between the members. This instrument contained four major areas of concern: (1) provisions concerning political cooperation in foreign policy; (2) provisions to complete
the internal market by 1992; (3) provisions conferring new areas of
competence in substantive areas of law on the EC institutions; and (4)
provisions that alter the way the EC institutions operate. 282 These
changes affected the decision making process of the EC. By removing
274. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 521.
275. See Documents Concerning the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European
Communities, 22 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291)(1979).
276. See Documents Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portugese
Republic to the European Communities, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 302)(1985).
277. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 526.
278. Draft Treaty on European Union, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 77) at 33 (1984).
279. Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, Milan, June 28 - 29, 1985, 85 COM. 310 (1985).
280. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 8(a).
281. Single European Act, 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986).
282. See J.A. Usher, The Institutions of the European Communities After the Single European Act, 19 BRACTON L. J. 64 (1987).
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the unanimity rule when adopting Directives which eliminate technical trade barriers, and replacing it with a qualified majority voting
rule, 283 the movement toward a single internal market was
launched. 284
Today, the member states and the institutions of the EC are planning for the December 31, 1992, completion of the internal market.
The EC's internal economic market represents twelve member states,
communicating in ten official languages, composed of 327 million individuals who produce a Gross Domestic Product of $4.8 billion annually. 285 This strict economic structure represents one part of the
European Union. In addition to the economic treaties, the member
states also engage in inter-governmental cooperation in several political areas.

L

The Maastricht Summit: The Next Phase of European
Integration

The internal market is planned to be completed by the end of
1992. This is a significant year in the history of the EC. It marks the
beginning of its transformation into a European Union. 286 On December 11, 1991, the heads of the governments of the 12 member
states concluded a summit conference on the future of Europe in
Maastricht, the Netherlands (Maastricht Summit). 287 The Maastricht
Summit conference produced a document establishing criteria for economic and monetary union (E.M. U.) by as early as 1996 and no later
than 1999. 288 This will strengthen the existing economic structure of
the EC. Additionally, and more significantly, it calls for political
union among member states in foreign policy and security. This
agreement was formalized in a signed treaty among the 12 member
states on Friday, February 8, 1992.
The Maastricht Summit calls for fixed exchange rates and a sin283. See Herzog, supra note 206, at 528.
284. See MICHAEL CALINGAERT, THE 1992 CHALLENGE FROM EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY'S INTERNAL MARK.ET 11 ( 1988).
285. See STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BASIC STATISTICS OF
THE CoMMUNITY 99, 39 (28th ed. 1991)(The population figure is for 1990. The Gross Domestic Product figure is for 1989, which was reported as 4,406,900 ECU. An ECU, European
Currency Unit, is a basket unit based on a certain quantity of each member states currency,
weighted on the basis of the average gross national product over five years (1969 - 73) and of
the intra-Community trade of each member state. In 1989, the conversion rate for one ECU
was $1.27(U.S.)).
286. Programme of the Commission/or 1992, RAPID, Feb. 12, 1992, at para. 1, available
in LEXIS, EUROPE Library, ALLNWS File.
287. Maastricht Summit Succeeds, supra note 19.
288. Id.
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gle currency for all member states by no later than January 1, 1999.
If, however, by January 1, 1996, some member states have satisfied a
set of economic criteria, 289 then the formation of a European Central
Bank and a single currency will begin. 290 If no members have satisfied
the economic criteria by 1998, then the members will meet and decide
which states qualify to begin the process on January 1, 1999. 291 To
ensure that the E.M.U. is achieved, an European Monetary Institute
will be created in 1994 which will eventually become the European
Central Bank. 292
In addition, the leaders at the Maastricht Summit agreed to an
"even closer union among the people of Europe" 293 by calling for
political union among the member states. The plan will begin, as
other proposals for change in the European Union have been initiated, by unifying small areas of what was formally under the domestic
control of each member state. First, it provides for a common foreign
and security policy which will operate at the inter-governmental
level. 294 In 1996, this will be reviewed to see if it should remain at the
inter-governmental level or be placed under the power of the institutions of the EC. 295 The Maastricht Summit increases the power of the
European Parliament concerning legislation in certain areas. 296
Additionally, immigration and asylum for all the member states
will also be dealt with through inter-governmental cooperation. 297
The proposals at the Maastricht Summit, if ratified, will create a European Police Intelligence agency (Europol) to deal with drug trafficking and organized crime. 298 It will also establish a European
citizenship and create a cohesion fund to provide economic aid to the
poorer member states. 299 Enlargement negotiations, which concern a
289. Although the text of the Maastricht Summit was not available, several sources reported the economic criteria as including: I) an inflation rate not more than 1.5 percentage
points higher than the EC's three lowest rates among member states; 2) a budget deficit not in
excess of three percent of Gross Domestic Product; 3) a long term interest rate not more than
two percentage points higher than the EC's three lowest; and 4) no devaluations of a currency
against any other within the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System for
at least two years. Id.
290. Id.
291. Maastricht Summit Succeeds, supra note 19. As part of the compromise at Maastricht, the U.K. and Denmark can opt-out of the final stages of the EMU.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Making Sense of Maastricht, supra note 20, at 14.
296. Maastricht Summit Succeeds, supra note 19.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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states application for membership into the EC, will be accelerated. 300
Finally, the Maastricht Summit provides for more qualified majority
voting in the Council. 301
As the European Union completes the final stages of economic
integration, the proposed changes at the Maastricht Summit have begun the movement towards closer political ties among the member
states. The European Union is transforming from a sophisticated
trading bloc into a clearly identifiable group. 302 Since it was created,
the European Union has been contemplated to encompass more than
just economic regulation. The founders realized political constraints
existed which would not allow complete integration to be achieved by
one agreement at one point in time. Therefore, it has developed
slowly, integrating the diverse member states first economically and
now politically. This framework under which the member states have
been brought together represents what has been called a constitutional
order. 303
V.

OPTIONS FOR A NEW CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

A.

The Range of Possible Solutions

In the wake of the Quebec Commission's request for proposals
for a new Canadian federal scheme, numerous suggestions have surfaced. One Canadian scholar points out that a new federal order
could take several forms, 304 ranging from an unlikely status quo
model to a "radically asymmetrical federation. " 303 The proposals fall
into three general categories covering a continuum of structural models. 306 At one extreme, new federal orders have been suggested.
These would resemble the existing order in Canada where sovereignty
is divided between provincial and federal governments. Any federal
form would require a reallocation of the powers and responsibilities at
each level of government.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, two separate and distinct
sovereign states would be created out of the existing federal order.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Making Sense of Maastricht, supra note 20, at 14.
Id. See also discussion supra text at part IV.F.
Id.
See CALINGAERT, supra note 284, at 11.
304. Ronald L. Watts is a Professor of Political Studies at Queen's University who specializes in the creation, operation and disintegration of old and new federations. OPTIONS,
supra note 7, at xvii.
305. Id. at 24.
306. See Ronald Watts, Canada's Constitutional Options: An Outline, in OPTIONS, supra
note 7, at 24.
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This would fulfill the goals of the separatists in Quebec. It would
require that all economic and political ties between Quebec and the
rest of Canada be severed. Canada's $400 billion national debt and all
financial assets would have to be divided between the two new
states. 307 In addition, many questions arise from this model concerning the Atlantic provinces which would be cut off from the rest of
Canada. Still other questions center on the status of existing treaty
relationships with other nations, and the possible revisions to the remaining Canadian federal order. 308
In the middle of the continuum, a new institutional structure
could be created based on a confederal model. Here, the characteristics of the sovereign states would remain vested in each member, but a
superstructure would be organized to manage common policies with
approval from member states. 309 This form of political order would
resemble the P.Q. 's "sovereignty association." 310 Additionally, this
model could take the form of a common market such as the EC. Canadian scholars who had previously looked at the EC as a possible
solution to Canada's former constitutional problems rejected it as a
comprehensive model for change. 311 It was argued that by adopting
an EC model, Canada would ignore its historical reality. The EC was
designed to promote unity and develop centralization, whereas Canada's historical dynamic is one of decentralization. 312 However, given
the inevitable re-negotiation of the Canadian federation, scholars examining developments in Europe today maintain that while it may
not be a model that can be directly adopted, it exemplifies the ingenuity that can be employed to create institutions around which a constitutional framework can be organized. 313 Additionally, these scholars
had looked at Europe before the European Union Treaty existed
which may now make it a more suitable model to follow.

307. See Martin Cohn, Why Quebec Debt Report Doesn't Add Up, TORONTO STAR, July
20, 1991, (Insight) at Dl.
308. See Ronald Watts, Canada's Constitutional Options: An Outline, in OPTIONS, supra
note 7, at 27.
309. Id. at 24.
310. See discussion supra text part 11.C.
311. See , e.g., David Matas, The EEC as a Model for Canada, 10 MANITOBA L.J. 259
(1980).
312. Id. at 279-80.
313. See Dan Soberman, European Integration: Are there Lessons for Canada?, in OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 205.
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The Federal Government's New Proposal to Shape
the Future of Canada

The idea of a new federal order based on the experience in Europe has been incorporated into the federal government's new proposal for constitutional change. On September 24, 1991, the Canadian
House of Commons received a document from Prime Minister Mulroney entitled Shaping Canada's Future Together. 314 The document
contains twenty-eight sections each of which is a proposal for constitutional reform including many similar to those contained in the
Meech Lake Accord. 31 ' It also contains a host of new proposals
which are more ambitious and far reaching than the Accord. In particular, it proposes changes which would lay the foundation for an
economic union modeled implicitly on the EC.
The government's reform package is broken down into three
parts separately titled: I) Shared Citizenship And Diversity; II) Responsive Institutions For A Modem Canada; and Ill) Preparing For
A More Prosperous Future. Part I addresses the meaning of being a
Canadian and recognizes the diversity within the country. It recognizes the rights of aboriginal peoples to participate in the current constitutional deliberations and reaffirms Quebec's distinctiveness.
In addition, section 7 of the proposal calls for the incorporation
of a "Canada Clause" into the Constitution Act. This would be the
corollary to Quebec's distinct society clause in section 2. It would
contain specific characteristics and values acknowledging who
Canadians are and who they aspire to be. Characteristics such as
equality of men and women, responsibility to protect and preserve the
environment and a contribution to building a strong Canada of peoples from many cultures and lands are included.
Section 7 would also add a clause that would establish the free
flow of people, goods, services and capital as a basic Canadian characteristic. This language is the centerpiece of the EC's economic union.
The EEC Treaty specifically enumerates these as the bases for developing a common market between its members. 316 By adopting this as
a fundamental characteristic, Canada would shape a federal order
similar to the EC.
Building on these basic characteristics, part II of the new propo314. See Shaping a New Future, supra note 12.
315. Most notably section 2 recognizing Quebec's Distinctiveness, section 9 and 10 aimed
at Senate reform, section 12 addressing Supreme Court appointments, section 13 proposing an
amending formula and section 19 covering immigration. Id.
316. See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, arts. 9, 48-73.
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sal would reform existing federal institutions. The result would be
equitable representation and effective control in each branch of government for the provinces and the territories. The most significant
change would be to the Senate. It would become an elected body, but
remain secondary to the House of Commons as a legislative body.
Finally, the federal government's proposal calls for a change to the
Supreme Court appointment procedure and the constitutional amending formula.
While the first two parts of the reform package hint at an economic union, part III makes it clear that the Canadian federal government wants to move towards an European model. Specifically,
section 14 would add a "common market clause" to the Constitution
Act, which would provide that "Canada is an economic union within
which persons, goods, services and capital may move freely without
barriers or restrictions based on provincial or territorial barriers." 317
This section would prohibit both the Parliament and Government of
Canada, and the legislatures and governments of the provinces from
contravening this principle by law or practice.31s
The Parliament of Canada would have the exclusive power to
make laws for the efficient functioning of the economic union under
the proposed section 15. 319 This section, however, requires that any
law made pursuant to this section must receive approval from twothirds of the provinces to have effect. 320
Section 16 calls for the harmonization of provincial and federal
economic policies. This is identical to the language in the EEC
Treaty that establishes such harmonization as a fundamental principal of the common market. 321 The federal government would improve the coordination of the budget-making process as well as
monetary and fiscal policies among the provinces. Lastly, an independent agency would be established to monitor and evaluate the
macroeconomic policies of the provinces and the federal government.
Finally, the last proposal indicates that the federal government
envisions that the future constitutional order in Canada will be based
on an economic union modeled after the EC. Section 28 calls for the
creation of a "Council of the Federation. " 322 This Council would be
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Shaping a New Furture, supra note 12, sec. 14(1).
Id. sec. 14(2).
Id. sec. 15(1).
Id. sec. 15(2).
See EEC Treaty, supra note 223, art. 2.
Shaping a New Future, supra note 12, sec. 28.
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added to the constitutional framework of Canada. 323 It would be
composed of federal, provincial and territorial governments who
would "decide issues of inter-governmental coordination and collaboration. " 324 Its mandate would be to vote on proposed legislation
aimed at enhancing the functioning of the economic union under section 15. Thus, the major institutional change of this proposed Canadian federal order would be the addition of a governmental body like
the Council established by the EEC Treaty. This is evidence that the
Europe's successful experience has influenced Canadian decisionmakers in their efforts to create a new constitutional order.
C.

The European Union: A Viable Solution for Canada?

The federal government's proposed constitutional reforms, discussed above, incorporate an economic union into its vision of a new
Canada. Other commentators also believe that the inevitable re-negotiation of the present federal order could result in one resembling the
emerging European Union. This new model of constitutional order,
as it has emerged in western Europe, provides Canada with a viable
course to follow when making changes to its fundamental legal order.
It will provide a stable economic union upon which closer political
ties can slowly be established among the provinces, territories and aboriginal peoples.
What has emerged from the European experience, is a formula
for integrating diverse societies under one legal order, sharing in its
burdens and benefitting from its successes. The structure, as it has
materialized, is one that is socially legitimate, because it has unanimous approval from all the member nations. It forms the basic common legal order that all the member states must follow and therefore
represents a constitutional framework under which diverse national
identities can co-exist.
A European Union type of federation would allow all the provinces to remain united in one Canadian legal order. The debate in
Canada over constitutional change has forced every province to reexamine its own identity. In this regard, establishing a European Union
framework would allow each province to maintain and promote its
unique cultural identity. This is especially true for Quebec which has
demanded constitutional recognition of its distinctness within Canada. Each province would retain a large degree of sovereignty to ensure control over areas of important provincial concern. This has
323. Id.
324. Id.
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worked in Europe and is perhaps the modem way in which sophisticated groups will agree to be part of a larger legal order.
Additionally, the historical context and the founding principles
of the Schuman Plan provide insight to the foundation of the successful development of the European Union. The original member states
united in order to preserve peace and minimize the threat of German
re-militarization. Today, Canada does not face any type of internal
military threat, but does have an impending social need to define its
national identity. By establishing certain principles to guide the formation of a Canadian legal order, the provinces could begin a new era
of integration. The result would be a constitutional framework that
develops slowly, but is socially and legally legitimate because it has
the approval of all its members.
The provinces realize that the breakdown of the Canadian union
as it exists today would have a negative economic impact in every
province. Unanimous agreement on a legal order could be reached if
fundamental principles were developed and aimed at the creation of
an economic union. This would allow each province to maintain a
large degree of control in its internal affairs while benefiting from the
larger economic market in which it could participate. First, the provinces could maintain the economic ties that are already exist in Canada. These bonds range from a common currency, to a federal
monetary system, to common trade agreements with third countries.
This economic framework would form the basis for allowing the provinces to develop closer political ties over time.
The provinces have been unable to agree on a federal structure
proposed by one document, such as the recent Accord or the original
BNA Act. The European Union began over forty years ago by focusing on economic integration and now, after the Maastricht Summit,
political integration. If the Canadian provinces can reach consensus
on an economic order, then they can move slowly toward closer political union. Given the complexity of the competing interests throughout Canada, 32s this solution may have a greater likelihood of success
than trying to create in one document an acceptable constitutional
structure before Quebec's October 1992 deadline.
325. See Thomas J. Courchene & John N. McDougall, The Context for Future Constitutional Options, in OPTIONS, supra note 7, at 33-51. The authors define the context for change
broadly including "geographic determinism (both physical and socio-economic), demolinguistics (the interaction among language, culture, and population), globalization and its impact on
nation states, Canada - U.S. free trade, debt - and deficit-driven fiscal decentralization and
aspects of the institutional/political malaise across [Canada]." Id. at 34.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1867, when the first Canadian union was established, the
provinces, especially Quebec, have struggled to create a federal order
acceptable to all. The failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the latest
attempt to resolve this dilemma, has made the reorganization or the
breakdown of the present Canadian order inevitable. As other federal
orders around the world also experience regional self-determination, a
model for collective federal unification has evolved in western Europe.
The European Union has brought together culturally and politically
diverse states under one common legal order, with each retaining the
power to promote its own unique identity. Its basic institutions were
founded on fundamental principles that have guided it through economic and political integration.
The context for constitutional change in Canada is marked by
complex competing factors and forces. Such an environment does not
lend itself to the creation of a constitutional structure based on one all
encompassing document. A new era of integration could begin by
establishing certain fundamental principles that receive unanimous
agreement. These principles would re-define the Canadian federal order according to the contemporary constitutional values of all the
provinces, territories and aboriginal peoples. The existing federal order could be modified and institutions could be established guided by
these principles. They would first establish an economic union based
on the existing Canadian infra-structure. This would set the stage for
slow political integration. Thus, following the European Union's
model of constitutional change could teach Canada a timely lesson in
its search for a new constitutional configuration.
Anthony J. Davis
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